We describe a method to encode fingerprint biometrics securely for use, e.g., in encryption or access control. The system is secure because the stored data does not suffice to recreate the original fingerprint biometric. Therefore, a breach in database security does not lead to the loss of biometric data. At the same time the stored data suffices to validate a probe fingerprint. Our approach is based on the use of distributed source coding techniques implemented with graph-based codes. We present a statistical model of the relationship between the enrollment biometric and the (noisy) biometric measurement taking during authentication. We describe how to validate or reject a candidate biometric probe given the probe and the stored encoded data. We report the effectiveness of our method as tested on a database consisting of 579 data sets, each containing roughly 15 measurements of a single finger. We thereby demonstrate a working secure biometric system for fingerprints.
INTRODUCTION
Securing access to physical locations and to data is of primary concern in many personal, commercial, governmental and military contexts. Classic solutions include carrying an identifying document or remembering a password. Problems with the former include forgeries and with the latter poorly-chosen or forgotten passwords.
Computer-verifiable biometrics provide a third approach. In these systems a sensor measures a biological feature of a person, for example, a fingerprint or an iris scan. It then compares the new sample, termed the probe, to a stored sample, termed the enrollment. If the samples match then, depending on the application, the person could be granted access or given a cryptographic key that is a function of the biometric. Advantages of biometrics include the fact that they cannot be forgotten, they can be hard to guess, and they can be difficult to forge.
Biometrics have certain characteristics that pose novel challenges and create new security holes. A central characteristic that differentiates biometrics from passwords is that each time a biometric is measured the observation differs. In the case of fingerprints the reading might change because of elastic deformations in the skin when placed on the sensor surface, dust or oil between finger and sensor, or a cut to the finger. Biometric authentication systems must be robust to such variations. Most biometric authentication systems deal with such variability by relying on pattern recognition. To perform recognition the enrollment biometric is stored on the device. This results in a serious security hole. If a malicious attacker gains access to the device, the attacker also gains access to the biometric. In contrast, passwords are not stored "in-the-clear". Instead, only the hash of a password is stored. When a user types in a password the computer compares the hash of the probe password to the stored hash Only if they match is access granted. Since the hash is effectively impossible to invert, security is not compromised even if an attacker learns the stored hash. Several researchers have attempted to develop "secure" biometric systems with similar characteristics.
Davida, Frankel, and Matt [1] consider the use of error correction coding as a solution to the secure biometrics problem. Juels and Sudan [2] introduce the idea of a fuzzy vault to formalize the use of error correcting codes for such applications. Some constructions for fingerprint biometrics exist, e.g., [3] [4] [5] , but yield high false reject rates (FRRs). A main stumbling block is how to model and exploit the statistical relationship between enrollment and probe. From an information theoretic perspective the secure biometric problem is a problem of "common randomness" [6] . Different parties observe correlated random variables (the enrollment and the probe) and then attempt to agree on a shared secret key (the enrollment biometric). The basic tool used to extract the secret is a distributed source code [7] .
Our formulation and proposed solution build on both sets of works. In our implementation we develop a statistical model of the "fingerprint channel" relating the enrollment to the probe, and use a graphical code to compress and scramble the enrollment probe. Iterative decoding using belief propagation (BP) is performed across both graphs. This successfully captures both the structure of the code and that of the measurement channel. Our initial work in this area considered iris biometrics [8] .
The outline of the remainder of the paper is as follow. In Section 2 we describe the operation of the system, identify an appropriate biometric feature set, develop a fingerprint channel model, and describe a natural attack on secured biometric systems. In Section 3 we test our channel model on synthetically-generated data, demonstrate that simpler models do not lead to good decoding performance. We then evaluate our system on a database of roughly 8100 test fingerprints. We conclude and discuss future work in Section 4. In this paper we focus on the implementation and evaluation of our prototype system. More details on system security can be found in [9] .
FEATURE SET AND STATISTICAL MODELING
In this section we describe the operation of our system and its required components. At enrollment we measure the original biometric x and compress it into a scrambled "syndrome" s which is our secured biometric. During authentication we measure y, a noisy ver- 
Fingerprint representation
A popular method for working with fingerprint data is to extract a set of "minutiae points" and to perform all subsequent operations on them. Figure 1 gives an example of a fingerprint, the minutiae points, and the extracted feature vector that we work with. Each minutiae is a discontinuity in the ridge map of a fingerprint, indicated by the circles in the left-hand plot. These points are mapped to a list of triplets representing the spatial and angular coordinates of each minutiae point. We visualize the feature vector using a matrix as depicted in the right-hand plot. Each quantized coordinate corresponds to a particular location in the matrix. The presence of a minutiae is indicated by a '1'. More generally, instead of simply indicating the presence or lack of minutiae points, the entries could indicate the angles of enrolled minutiae points.
Modeling the movement of fingerprint minutiae
We create a statistical model for the fingerprint channel which captures three effects: (1) movement of enrollment minutiae when observed the second time in the probe, (2) deletions-minutiae observed at enrollment, but not during probe, and (3) insertions-"spurious" minutiae observed in probe, but not during enrollment. Figure 2 Fig. 2 capture the relative change in position of an enrollment minutiae, and ZAm(t) = {zi i e Nf(t)} are the set of these variables in the neighborhood of enrollment position t. The upside-down triangle factor nodes (V) represent the prior probability distribution both on minutiae movement and the event that a spurious minutiae is generated at this position. If a minutiae moves beyond its neighborhood, the model treats it as a deletion and an insertion.
The variables Zt take values in the set Zt e {®: *, ANf(t)}. If Zt = 0, then a spurious minutiae unrelated to the enrollment was generated at position t in the probe. If z, = * there is no minutiae at position t in the probe (i.e., yt = 0). The In this paper the secure biometric s is a "syndrome" vector. Each syndromes sj is the mod-2 sum of the enrollment variables xt to which sj is connected by a syndrome graph. The connections defining the syndrome graph are generated according to a low-density parity-check (LDPC) code. These are state-of-the-art channel codes. A main reason for using LDPCs is that they are well represented graphically. This makes it easy to merge their description into the graphical model movement to implement BP decoding. Each local constraint of the syndrome code (sj, x) is an indicator function equaling one if the value of the syndrome sj is compatible with x and zero otherwise. The complete model used for decoding Px,y,s(X, y, S) = px,y(X, y) Hj W(sj, x) is shown in Fig. 2 .
Given the graphical model for px,y,s, the raw message passing rules for use in belief propagation can be derived using standard techniques [10] . In order to make the computations tractable we introduce a number of computational optimizations. These optimizations exploit the particular structure of the messages, the graph, and the quantities being computed. We introduce the "zero-probe" attack to test this security. The attacker know s, it knows the code structure, and it can use any attack it likes. The attacker guesses y = 0 and uses BP to try to solve the syndrome decoding problem. If RLDPC is small enough this BPbased attack will recover x. However, when RLDPC is below, but close to 1 -Hb(pp) this attack fails. We report the efficacy of this attack, as well as that of the standard biometric attack of using some other fingerprint in conjunction with s to decode. The success rate of the latter attack is given by the false-acceptance rate (FAR). A more detailed analysis of system security is provided in [9] .
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We now report decoding performance on synthetic data as well as on a proprietary Mitsubishi Electric (MELCO) fingerprint database. 
Synthetic data
The synthetic data model consists of a 70 x 100 grid of minutiae locations. The prior probability on the presence of a minutiae is pp = 0.005. The probability of an erasure is Pe = 0.2. The probability of a spurious minutiae is p, = 0.001. We use a uniform prior on movement over a two-dimensional area with a maximum displacement of 2 in either the horizontal or vertical directions. Each (non-edge) minutiae has a neighborhood size PJA(t) = 25.
The syndrome code is a randomly-generated LDPC code. For RLDPC= 0.94 all check nodes are of degree 50, 0.1% of the variable nodes are of degree 2, 99.8% are of degree 3, and 0.1% are of degree 4. For RLDPC= 0.95 all check nodes are of degree 80, 60% of the variable nodes are of degree 3, and 40% are of degree 8. We test the effectiveness of the zero-probe attack by generating 10000 attacks on 10000 independently-generated syndromes at different code rates. The results in terms of SAR (successful attack rate) are reported in the second column of Table 1 . We conclude that for RLDPC > 0.94 our system is safe from the zero-probe attack, although it is not information theoretically secure.
To test the necessity of the detailed minutiae movement model of Sec. 2 we evaluate a simpler statistical model. Erasures and spurious minutiae are modeled as in Sec. 2. But, instead ofjoint constraints on minutiae movement, we model minutiae movements as independent. If a minutiae is present in the probe at position t (i.e., yt = 1), we model the likelihoods of any xtl such that t C Af(t') as equally likely. The resulting FRRs of BP decoding using this "simple model" are reported in Table 1 . The performance in terms of error rates is comparable to (indeed, slightly worse than) that of the zero-probe attack (compare the FRR with one minus the zero-probe SAR).
Finally, to generate results for the full model, we sample 50 different codes at random from the degree distribution and test each on 1000 independent samples of (x, y). FRR is averaged over all trials. To understand the relative impact of erasures and spurious minutiae, we also considered the case of movement and spurious only (Pe = 0), and movement and erasures only (p, = 0). Erasures are seen to be more harmful than spurious insertions.
Tests on MELCO database
The MELCO database consists of measurements of 1000 fingers. Each of these 1000 data sets contains roughly 15 measurements of the corresponding finger. We select one of the measurements as the enrollment and try to decode using the remaining measurements as probes. All syndrome calculations use the rate RLDPC= 0.94 code described above. We simulated the performance of 1000 randomlygenerated codes on synthetic data and used the 5 best in a roundrobin manner to encode the MELCO data. This avoids particularly bad random codes. We now detail the experimental setup. 
